Teoria pluralistica del diritto privato. Un pluralismo di scienze sociali fondato su valori costituzionali (“Pluralismo normativo”)
Sommario: 1. Riflessioni preliminari su Costituzione e teoria del diritto privato. – 2. L’orientamento monistico della teoria interdisciplinare del diritto. – 2.1. Law and Economics come esempio e caso particolare. – 2.1.1. Segue. a) Chiaro orientamento in scopo e metodologia. – 2.1.2. Segue. b) Modelli particolarmente pronti per una possibile riflessione giuridica interdisciplinare. – 2.2. I tre dilemmi. – 2.2.1. a) Tracce di pluralismo negli approcci utilitaristici, come il Capabilities Approach. – 2.2.2. Segue. b) La (problematica) misurabilità. – 2.2.3. Segue. c) La messa in discussione degli approdi fondamenti, come la razionalità. – 2.3. Un bilancio provvisorio dell’orientamento monistico. – 3. L’orientamento pluralistico della teoria interdisciplinare del diritto. – 3.1. Superiorità euristica: l’apertura del fondamento epistemologico e valutativo. – 3.1.1. a) L’apertura euristica come opportunità di una teoria del diritto pluralistica. – 3.1.2. Segue. b) Il contratto organizzativo: un esempio. – 3.2. Superiorità normativa: pluralismo assiologico come obiettivo del diritto (costituzionale). – 3.3. Superiorità ontologica: fondamento valutativo pluralistico e autocomprensione della scienza giuridica.
Pluralist legal theory is about how to integrate knowledge from the whole of society. This is not just another plea for more interdisciplinary input into law production and adjudication. Rather, different modes of integration of interdisciplinary insight are contrasted with each other and a clear preference is expressed. The paper distinguishes monist approaches to interdisciplinary legal theory (referring to one neighbouring discipline like in law and economics) from broadly pluralist approaches (drawing on all relevant disciplines in principle). It argues that monist approaches do not do justice to the basic value structure enshrined in constitutions – as the ultimate benchmark accepted in democratic societies under the rule of law. Indeed nowadays, all these constitutions are rather unanimously seen as opting for a broadly pluralist view of society (see Article 2 TEU). Therefore, monist interdisciplinary approaches certainly bring important new knowledge, but typically do not suffice and exhaust the question of adequate value judgment. Thus, pluralist interdisciplinary legal theory not only is richer in heuristic sources – drawing on a whole array of disciplines –, it is also the only approach in line with the constitutional architecture. Moreover, such an approach brings back legal scholarship and adjudication to the role it had for centuries when it still was the sole science about (order in) society. Legal scholarship and adjudication would again have the role of having the overall say on weighing the different interests and perspectives in society and create a just balance. The main problem of this approach – constitutionally mandated, richer in knowledge and more appropriate for the proprium of legal scholarship – is this. It is difficult to find order in such an ‘ocean’ of theories stemming from different disciplines. They need not only to be ‘translated’ into legal concepts, but as well been put in order. The paper exposes several answers that can already be found in literature on this issue (including hierarchies or balancing). The paper proposes that a so-called value tracking method might be most appropriate. This method would consist in searching in the constitutions themselves or the democratically decided upon value systems also the weight that can be given to values that the respective theories propose to develop in particular depth. Thus constitutions would serve as an overarching value system not only for all law – also private law, as we have learned over a few decades –, but also for a pluralist legal methodology.